The conciliation committee is the ultimate bicameral dispute settlement mechanism of the 
In the codecision procedure, now the ordinary legislative procedure of the European Union (EU), the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers employ a conference committee, called the conciliation committee, to settle ultimately the differences that may arise during the adoption of legislation. Who wins in these negotiations, the Council or the Parliament? Are they on an equal footing? What are the factors that determine bargaining success within the committee?
Conference committees are frequently employed in bicameral legislatures to solve outstanding disagreements after a bill has been shuffled back and forth between the two chambers. How these committees operate eventually determines the balance of power between the chambers. As Tsebelis and Money (1997: 118) observe, 'the composition of the conference committee, its decision-making rule, and the set of bicameral restrictions are critically important to the results of bicameral bargaining'.
In most formal models of EU codecision making, the success of a chamber is determined by an arbitrary assumption about the first mover or a random recognition rule (Crombez, 1997 (Crombez, , 2001 Steunenberg, 1994 Steunenberg, , 1997 Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000) . These models are primarily interested in identifying an equilibrium that can be used for inter-procedural comparisons. For Napel and Widgrén (2006) instead, the institutional set-up is biased in favour of the Council because its pivotal member is likely to have a higher disagreement value that the respective member in the Parliament. However, the most systematic empirical research on this issue has found that, at least as far as the 1999-2002 period is concerned, these negotiations favour the Parliament (König et al., 2007) . Moreover, the Strasbourg assembly is more likely to win over the Council when it is more proximate to the status quo, it is cohesive 1 and it has the support from the European Commission.
In this work, we will confirm some of these results and take issue with others. We will argue that the conciliation committee is a conference committee by half, in the sense that it is a meeting between a full upper chamber, on the one side, and a delegation of a lower chamber. This, in combination with a unit rule to take decisions, 2 is likely to bias outcomes 1 Low cohesiveness in the Council is also beneficial for the Parliament. On the other hand, the brief case study of Tsebelis and Money (1997: 176-9, 204 ) leans toward greater influence of the Council. Hagemann and Høyland (2010) offer evidence of greater influence of the Council in codecision in the earlier stages of the procedure. They argue that 'the Council has conditional agenda-setting power due to a change in the majority thresholds for adopting legislation from the first to the second reading in the Parliament' (811). 2 Agreements are approved under closed rule by concurrent majorities in the two chambers (Tsebelis and Money, 1997: 176-9) .
in favour of the Council. We offer evidence in support of this proposition by examining almost all the dossiers that reached conciliation from the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty to February 2012 and estimating, through Slapin and Proksch's (2009, 2008) Wordfish algorithm, the similarity between the committee's joint texts and the documents produced by the two chambers. This evidence suggests that, in almost seventy percent of times, the final agreement is more similar to the position of the Council. As expected, the Parliament has been more successful after the reform of the Treaty of Amsterdam and in dossiers where the Council decides by qualified majority voting. The Parliament benefits also if the rapporteur comes from a large party because a veto threat is more easily executable. In line with Konig et al. (2007) , the support from the Commission is crucial to parliamentary success, but negotiations are also affected by differences among conferees in the availability of ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms employed to oversee execution across implementation paths. Weaker or no support is found for other factors.
Getting to conciliation
The This procedure has changed over time. Before the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Council could not conclude the procedure and adopt a final act after the first parliamentary reading, nor could the Parliament do so at its second reading. The definitive adoption was a Council prerogative. More important for our purposes, if negotiations within the conciliation committee failed, the Council could make a final take-it-or-leave-it offer to the Parliament, which had to muster an absolute majority to halt irrefutably the proposed measure. This last procedural step strengthened, at least in principle, the negotiating hand of the Council (Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996; Garrett, 1995) , but the adoption of a rule of procedure, stating that the parliamentary leadership would table a motion to reject in such circumstance, has presumably limited the Council's potential gains (Hix, 2002; Kasack, 2004) .
A second, less noted, procedural change was the modification of the voting rule in the Council. The Treaty of Maastricht, for instance, specified that measures in the fields of culture as well as the multiannual framework programme in research and technological development were to be adopted following the codecision procedure, but the Council will have to act unanimously. The Council's bargaining hand was presumably stronger in these cases as it could credibly threaten rejection if just a single minister was not happy with the proposal at hand. Qualified majority voting was extended to the framework programme by the Treaty of Amsterdam and to cultural policy by the Treaty of Lisbon. Table 1 illustrates the frequency with which the conciliation committee has been used.
During the fourth and fifth parliamentary term, this dispute settlement mechanism has been employed once every five Commission's proposals. Even allowing for learning and adaptation, this indicates significant inter-institutional conflict. The Treaty of Amsterdam, that made early agreements possible, did not seem to ease up tensions, at least in the first five years. On the other hand, there has been a significant drop in the employment of the committee over the last two legislative terms. The lower incidence is a product of the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure to the majority of EU policy areas, thus inflating the denominator. It also indicates the development of new mechanisms of interinstitutional cooperation, such as the informal trialogues that take place during the first reading between selected representatives of the Council, Parliament and Commission. Early agreements are more likely when negotiators are more certain about each other's positions and are pressed for time. They are less likely when a new measure is under negotiation, the Council and Parliament are more divided and when the rapporteur, if from a large party, is less representative of the whole assembly (Rasmussen, 2011) . Although they may have speeded up decision making, early agreements have not entirely replaced the next stages of the procedure. Importantly, they ultimately take place in the shadow of the conciliation committee. In sum, conciliation appears to becoming now a proper mechanism to settle disputes, which is used only occasionally. The most divisive and salient dossiers are likely to reach this last stage, and how it operates may well structure backwardly the incentives earlier on in the procedure.
< TABLE 1 APPROX HERE >

Conciliation bargaining
Disagreement value
Under which conditions should we expect actors to be more or less accommodating when they sit at the negotiating table of the conciliation committee? In case of symmetry between two bargainers, the Nash cooperative solution is driven by the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (Dixit and Skeath, 1999: 523-9 , 2007: 285-6) . The utility that actors attach to the status quo drives the solutions of spatial models of codecision bargaining as well (Crombez, 1997 (Crombez, , 2001 Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996; Garrett, 1995; Steunenberg, 1994 Steunenberg, , 1997 Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000) . More specifically, Napel and Widgrén (2006) model the negotiations within the conciliation committee and predict the Council to be significantly more influential than the Parliament.
The source of this power resides on the fact that, under symmetric preference distributions, the Council pivotal member under qualified majority voting is likely to attach a higher value to the status quo (i.e. be more conservative) than the median voter in the Parliament.
Unfortunately, corroborating evidence is hard to come by. Extending and replicating the work of Thomson et al. (2006) , Thomson (2011) finds that a model based on a Nash bargaining solution which assumes the disagreement outcome to be equally and highly undesirable for all bargaining actors has greater explanatory power than a similar model with a reference point (or status quo). In other words, including an estimate of the utility associated with failure worsens the predictive power of a model of EU decision-making.
Closer to our interest, results appear contradictory. On the one hand, Costello and Thomson (2011) confirm that being closer to the status quo does not enhance the chances of success of the Parliament in codecision. On the other hand, König et al. (2007) find that proximity to the status quo allow a chamber to exert greater influence in conciliation negotiations. We have reasons to doubt this latter result however. These scholars have employed a variable that takes the value of 1 if the Parliament is located closer to the status quo, -1 if it is located closer to the Council, and zero if no information was available. Accordingly, zero means that the two institutions attach the same value to the status quo. Missing data have therefore been treated as highly informative. The impossibility to locate the status quo -the majority of observations in this study -has been considered as univocally indicating that
Council and Parliament attach the same value to the disagreement outcome. We are not sure whether this is the best method to treat missing information, especially given the availability of maximum likelihood or multiple imputation approaches (Allison, 2001 ).
How can we explain these results? For Achen (2006: 102) These differences are best analysed employing Baron and Ferejohn's (1989) Lastly, considering Garrett and Tsebelis' (1996) argument, we also control for the Amsterdam Treaty reform in the inferential analysis.
4 Indeed, inside the delegation, individual members operate under majority and open rule but, ultimately, they collectively enjoy majority and closed rule vis-à-vis the assembly. 5 Permanent representatives, the de facto negotiators, are even more constrained because they cannot promise and deliver compromises without the consent of their ministers (Tsebelis and Money, 1997: 204) . 6 Tsebelis and Money (1997: 176-9 ) note also how its unit rule to take decisions as well as the limited restrictions imposed by the parent chambers (negotiations cover the entire bill, and it is possible to find innovative solutions and to trade across issues) offer the committee the capacity to reach many different compromises. This can clearly be detrimental to the assembly. However, greater emphasis has been put on germaneness over the years. The two delegations bargain over a four column working document listing the second reading of the Parliament and the common position of the Council as well as the Council's opinion on the Parliament position and the updated comments of the parliamentary delegation. proposer facing, with a given probability, two types of receivers (moderate and extremist) with low and high disagreement values respectively. Her take-it-or-leave-it offer is more accommodating if the probability of dealing with an extreme receiver is high and her utility difference between an aggressive and an accommodating offer is small (McCarty and Meirowitz, 2007: 295) . This simple set up indicates that actors benefit from manipulating beliefs about an actor's type (i.e. reputation). A moderate receiver is better off if the 7 We will not consider two factors: representativeness of the parliamentary delegation and cohesiveness of the chambers. As Tsebelis and Money (1997: 110-8) remind us, representativeness matters and, for codecision cases in general, Costello and Thomson (2011) find that a representative rapporteur is beneficial to the Parliament. Empirically, unrepresentativeness does not appear to be an issue. Rasmussen (2008) show that the delegation tends to reflect the composition of the whole assembly by political groups. Anyway, it is the direction of the preference bias that should matter. The delegation could be more accommodating towards the Council than the whole assembly; or, it could be more recalcitrant. While an accommodating delegation may be detrimental to the assembly by agreeing on a joint document that is farther from the assembly position; it is unclear why a recalcitrant delegation should produce the same outcome. Actually, a chamber may have an incentive to create a recalcitrant committee as it could be a more effective intercameral negotiator (Gailmard and Hammond, 2011) . Unfortunately, it is very hard to determine the nature of the delegation because it ultimately depends on (a speculation on) the location of the status quo. Assume that we know the location of the median voter in the delegation and in the assembly. To determine whether the delegation is accommodating or recalcitrant we need to know the position of the (unanimity or qmv)-pivot in the Council. But to determine this, we ultimately need to know, or speculate on, the position of the status quo. Related to representation are König et al.'s (2007) findings that higher parliamentary cohesiveness diminishes Council's and increases Parliament's success rates, and that lower Council cohesiveness increases parliamentary success. König et al. argue that 'the winset of less cohesive non-unitary institutional actors is larger. Because more cohesive non-unitary institutional actors accept fewer alternatives that beat the status quo, the bargaining outcome is expected to shift towards them' (289-90). However, the relation between cohesiveness and the size of the winset of the status quo is highly conjectural and changes direction with different decision rules. Consider cohesion as the inverse of the radius r of a Y-centred yolk of a majorityvoting collective player. The Y-centred wincircle, with radius d + 2r (where d is the distance between Y and the status quo), defines an upper bound -there are no points of the winset of the status quo located outside it. By definition a decrease in cohesiveness increases the wincircle, but 'it is not always the case that an increased wincircle will entail an increase in the size of the winset of the status quo' (Tsebelis, 2002: 48) . Tsebelis provides an example of an increase in winset as the wincircle shrinks (i.e. as cohesiveness increases). Albeit anecdotal, the rejection by the Parliament of the joint text on biotechnological inventions seems to originate from a diminished cohesiveness (and smaller winset) after the European elections (Rittberger, 2000: 563) . For collective actors deciding by qualified majority, the so-called q-circle determines the radius and centre of the wincircle. Lower cohesion (i.e. larger yolk) is actually more likely to reduce the size of the wincircle and winset, although one can find counterexamples (Tsebelis, 2002: 53). proposer beliefs that she is an extreme type. These incentives are best analysed through signalling models. Although none has been developed with the conciliation committee in mind, several are on offer. In an influential model on veto threats, Matthews (1989) shows that the most informative equilibrium consists of an accommodating receiver signalling his true type and other receivers issuing a veto threat to whom the proposer offers concessions.
Uncertainty, veto threats and reputation
Unanimity in the
Importantly, there is no guarantee for this equilibrium to exist. In a dynamic model of reputation building and bargaining over multiple bills, McCarty (1997) shows how a receiver has an incentive to reject a first-period proposal to build a reputation as an extreme type in order to obtain a better outcome from a second-period proposal. Given these incentives, the proposer may be more accommodating in the first period to avoid rejection on reputational grounds. This dynamics holds if receiver and proposer are sufficiently divergent.
In conciliation, there is no predetermined receiver or proposer and uncertainty may work either way. However, since the Council is fully represented, uncertainty about the type of Council the parliamentary delegation is dealing with is plausibly lower than the uncertainty about the type of full assembly the Council delegation is facing. Said differently, when can the parliamentary delegation extract concessions from the Council by credibly promising that the deal will be honoured by the assembly?
8 Benedetto (2005) argues that bargaining inside the Parliament is more transparent than bargaining inside the Council and this should work in favour of the latter institution. This is the case prior to getting to conciliation. During these negotiations however, the whole Council and the parliamentary delegation are in full view, whereas the whole assembly is not.
Unfortunately, formal models do not offer much. 9 We pay particular attention to the leading players involved in the conciliation negotiations -the president of the Council and the rapporteur of the Parliament -because they are widely recognized as being influential relay actors (e.g. Farrell and Héritier, 2004; Rasmussen, 2005) . Rapporteurs from large parties or in a position of leadership in the Parliament may be more successful in extracting concessions because they have more resources to sanction defection in the assembly and, if necessary, to make good on veto threats. Instead, the potential gains and the efficacy of threats by rapporteurs from parties represented in the Council may be instead undermined primarily because their allegiance is also with the national parties in government. If the president of the Council comes from new member states, it is also plausible to suggest that she would be more easily subject to belief manipulation as she is still learning the ropes of negotiation. She may also be facing higher reputational costs of a failed negotiation (Hosli et al., 2011) . This could work in favour of the parliamentary assembly. Finally, McCarty's (1997) model suggests the Council to be more accommodating at the beginning of the parliamentary term as there may be non-trivial reputational incentives operating within the assembly at large.
There is no agreement on the impact of these factors in the literature. Costello and Thomson (2011: 341) also expect large party rapporteurs to be more successful because they 'can credibly claim to be more in touch with the views of the majority of MEPs'. König et al. (2007) and Yao (1991) analyse the consequences of a receiver successfully issuing a commitment threat of the sort: "I'll veto any bill that is not in the set C" (362), but this model is silent on the circumstances in which the receiver has the incentive and ability to make such a threat (Cameron, 2000: 197) . 10 Both are predominantly preference-based arguments, although Costello and Thomson touch upon the issue of informative signals. König et al. (2007: 291) state that 'sending agents with extreme positions is advantageous for the (median) institutional actor' (but, operationally, they consider rapporteurs from the liberal party as extremists). On the issue of representativeness see note 6.
the Parliament has less success in codecision when the rapporteur holds a leadership position. We leave the corroboration of these propositions to the empirical analysis.
Implementation
We conclude considering how expectations about the implementation of a measure may affect the resolve of the Council and the Parliament. This factor is ignored by the literature on legislative bargaining, but re-election minded politicians are ultimately concerned about the outcomes of their decisions: how the implementation of a measure delivers benefits to their constituency. We will consider two issues.
First, another significant finding of König et al. (2007) is the importance of the opinion of the Commission in determining the relative success of the Parliament and Council in conciliation. The Commission may be able to exercise influence under favourable circumstances, when it enjoys some informational advantages or manages to assemble support from non-legislative actors (König et al., 2007; Moravcsik, 1999; Pollack, 2003; Rasmussen, 2003) . But perhaps, aside from informal influence, the views of the Unsurprisingly, compared to ministers, parliamentarians prefer greater involvement of the latter at the expense of the former (Franchino, 2007: 285-6) . When national authorities are the primary implementers, we should expect parliamentarians to be less accommodating than ministers at the legislative stage because oversight via legislative design is more important to them. In these circumstances, we should expect instead ministers to be more accommodating because ex-post oversight is individual rather than collective.
Text-based measures of legislative bargaining success
There However, even though several coders are employed, reliability may still be an issue.
Since we want to analyse the full history of conciliation negotiations, we will employ the second approach. To minimize reliability problems and facilitate replication, we use Slapin where is the count of word j in document i, and are document and word fixed effects respectively, β is an estimate of a word specific weight capturing the importance of word j in discriminating between positions, and ω is the estimate of document i's position.
The systematic component is estimated through an expectation maximization algorithm.
This procedure has several qualities, which are well explained by Slapin and Proksch (2008) ; it has also some problematic features though. It constrains positions on a single dimension, estimated by the parameter ω. The fact that there tends to be a privileged dimension of conflict in bicameral bargaining brings some solace (Tsebelis and Money, 1997: 90) , although more than one dimension may persist in these negotiations (König et al., 2007) .
Our estimates are based on three official documents: the second reading of the Parliament, the Council common position and the joint text. In Appendix A, we explain in detail how the original documents have been treated to produce the data on which the Wordfish procedure is run. In Appendix B, we examine the validity of these estimates comparing them with those produced using five documents (adding, therefore, the Commission proposal and the first reading of the Parliament), hand-coding and expert interviews.
Dataset and variables
As illustrated in Baron and Ferejohn's (1989) implication that a larger membership should work against the Parliament, we include the variable MEPs, measuring the size of the assembly at the time of the adoption of the joint text by the committee.
Moving on to veto threats and reputation, we have argued that rapporteurs from large parties or in a position of leadership within the Parliament may service better their assembly. Large party rapporteur takes the value of one if the rapporteur is from either the European People's Party or the Party of European Socialists, while, as in Costello and Thomson (2011: 348) , Leader rapporteur takes the value of one if the rapporteur held a leadership position. Rapporteurs from national parties that are represented in the Council may instead be less effective in extracting concessions. Government rapporteur takes the 12 PreLex and EurLex were the primary sources but, for dossiers prior to the V legislative term, we had to collect documents from either the Official Journal or the public registers of the Parliament and the Council. 13 EP success can be alternatively operationalized as | | | |, taking increasing positive values with greater success. This estimate requires a level of inter-policy comparability that is unlikely to be satisfied. Moreover, take two values of , closer to, but equidistant from , and assume that the first one falls outside the range (this has occurred in our data, should not be interpreted as distributed along a Euclidean policy dimension). Because | | is larger, this measure produces a higher degree of EP success in the first case even though the two are equidistant from . texts that were more similar to its reading. In Table 3 , we show the results of binomial tests with an epiphenomenal conciliation committee as null hypothesis (i.e. where the probability of parliamentary success is 0.5) for the full dataset and the subset of amending acts. We run the tests also for each legislative term with more than twenty observations. The probability that the expected frequency of success (k) in case of an epiphenomenal committee exceeds the observed frequency of success is above 98 percent in most cases. In other words, the Parliament significantly underperforms in these negotiations. The Council does better even in case of amending legislation, when its pivotal member may not be more conservative than the median voter in Parliament (cf. Napel and Widgrén, 2006) . Only in the fifth term and in case of amending laws, the committee did not produce a biased outcome.
< TABLE 3 APPROX HERE >
In the earlier days, the joint text differed from the Parliament second reading and from the Council common position more than the extent to which these latter two documents differed from each other. 14 The frequency of these cases has diminished over time however.
They were the majority of observations in the third and fourth legislative term, but they have not exceeded thirty percent ever since. This could indicate that, over time, the two chambers are relying on conciliation as a more proper dispute settlement mechanism.
What determines parliamentary success? member that is the least accommodating towards the demands of the Parliament. This weakness clearly emerges from the data. Additionally, the probability of success has increased by between 14.9 and 18 percentage points after the reform of the codecision procedure introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Despite evidence to the contrary (Hix, 2002; Kasack, 2004) , it seems that these changes have actually strengthened the Parliament's hand. This is in line with Garrett and Tsebelis ' (1996) analysis of parliamentary powers under the first version of codecision. The size of the parliamentary assembly appears instead irrelevant.
< TABLE 4 APPROX HERE >
The results from the belief-manipulation expectations are weaker. We do not find evidence that rapporteurs in a position of leadership can extract more concessions from the Council. Costello and Thomson's (2011) opposite expectation is also disconfirmed. Moreover, the Parliament is not worse off if the rapporteur is from a party represented in the Council. If instead she comes from a large party, the probability of parliamentary success increases by between 13.1 and 14.9 percentage points. Costello and Thomson (2011) put more emphasis on representation to explain this outcome. We have argued that large party rapporteurs can extract more concessions because they have greater capacity to make good on veto threats.
Moving on, there is weak evidence that Council presidents coming from newer member states are more accommodating toward the Parliament, perhaps because their beliefs are more easily manipulable or they attach a higher reputational cost to failure. In 1998, Greece had been a member of the EU for seventeen years, while Austria had just joined three years earlier. If a Greek rather than an Austrian minister presided over the Council in the second semester of that year, the likelihood of parliamentary success would have lowered by 13.2 percentage points.
Reputational incentives clearly do not seem to operate within the assembly at the beginning of a term as McCarty's (1997) model suggests. Actually, there is weak evidence to the contrary. A Parliament facing elections in six months is 7.9 percentage points more likely to win in conciliation than a Parliament six months into its term. A weak learning process may be at place here.
Implementation instead matters. If the Commission decides to reject all of the second reading amendments of the Parliament, rather than only half of them, the chances that the Parliament would win in conciliation diminishes by 14.4 percentage points. This is in line with the finding of König et al. (2007) , although we tend to prefer a causal explanation based on the formal role entrusted upon the Commission in implementation rather than on informal bargaining resources. Certainly, the two causal stories are not mutually exclusive and may be related.
Results also indicate that the probability of parliamentary success increases by 19.5 percentage points in case of directives. When national administrations are more involved in implementation than the Commission is, parliamentarians are less accommodating because legislative design is the primary control mechanism at their disposal. On the other hand, ministers are more accommodating because they can rely on a wide array of ex-post control mechanisms. In other words, parliamentarians value legislative design as control mechanism much more than ministers do.
Finally, the probability of parliamentary success diminishes by 12.5 percentage points when next acts are negotiated. In these circumstances, a more accommodating Parliament may indeed indicate that its members care more than ministers about adopting the measure.
In other words, a negotiating failure is more costly to parliamentarians.
Conclusion
From the standpoint of the Parliament, this study offers solace and annoyance. Solace because the Amsterdam Treaty reform appears to have delivered the benefits the Parliament expected and because the phasing-out of unanimity from Council proceedings has strengthened the hand of the assembly in conciliation negotiations. Annoyance because the set-up of the conciliation committee remains structurally biased against the Parliament. The Council does better even when amending measures are under negotiation, that is, when its pivotal minister may not enjoy a higher payoff than the median parliamentarian in case of failure (cf. Napel and Widgrén, 2006) . Perhaps counterintuitively, it is the strength of the parliamentary delegation vis-à-vis the full assembly that is the source of the latter's weakness vis-à-vis the Council. Likewise, it is the weakness of each minister vis-à-vis her colleagues that is the source of strength for the whole Council.
Despite this structural weakness, getting to conciliation is not a foregone conclusion. The Parliament has managed to negotiate a joint text that is closer to its second reading in 30.2 percent of dossiers that have reached conciliation. This proportion increases to 37.6 percent in the current setting (i.e., post-Amsterdam Treaty procedure and majority voting in the Council). What else explain parliamentary success? We have some support for theories that put emphasis on belief manipulation. A veto threat by a rapporteur belonging to a large party is more executable and may induce the Council to be more accommodating.
Evidence about the importance of implementation is more robust however. Of whom the Commission takes side matters because, we contend, its role in implementation is far from trivial. Politicians cannot ignore the effective delivery of a measure's benefits.
Additionally, when national administrations are more involved in implementation than the Commission, parliamentarians are less accommodating than ministers because they value more legislative design as mechanism to control policy execution.
The Parliament could also take advantage of other weapons, such as explicitly setting credible restrictions over the set of acceptable solutions (Tsebelis and Money, 1997: 176) .
Indeed, the self-imposed rules of representativeness of its delegation, which Rasmussen 
Appendix B Validation
We have compared our estimates with those derived from three alternative procedures:
Wordfish estimation employing five official documents, hand-coding and expert surveys. In this appendix, we report the results of this validation exercise.
Comparison with EP success estimates based on five documents
According to Slapin and Proksch (2008) , the stability of the word parameters improves if the estimation is performed using more and longer documents. We do not have a problem of length in our case, but we should consider the possibility in including five documents in the estimation procedure, namely adding the Commission proposal and the first reading of the Parliament. 21 Note that this is not how the conciliation committee operates. The first two documents are ignored. Despite some freedom of manoeuvre (Tsebelis and Money, 1997: 176-9) , negotiations tend to be germane, with the two delegations bargaining over a Table 1A , we show the results of binomial tests with an epiphenomenal conciliation committee as null hypothesis. The probability that the expected frequency of success, in case of an epiphenomenal committee, exceeds the observed frequency is above 99 percent in the full sample and the fourth legislative term. There are some important differences as well tough. The probability of parliamentary success is not significantly less than 0.5 in the fifth and sixth terms. The five-text estimation procedure picks up then a strengthening of the Parliament over time (not because of Codecision II 21 Using documents from different dossiers is meaningless because it implies imposing a single dimension upon different policy areas. 22 The txt and csv files are also available from the replication data webpage of European Union Politics and from Fabio Franchino's personal webpage. The folder is named disaggregated_data_5docs.
though, as its effect is insignificant) or, perhaps, finds it harder to distinguish between the last three documents as legislators become more selective in relying on conciliation. In this situation, we could not determine whether the conciliation committee took a position closer to either of the other two institutions. We therefore coded this subunit as 'Partially changed'. We have been therefore rather conservative in deciding whether a text was closer to the position of one chamber in order to ensure an acceptable degree of intercoder reliability. We also replicated the coding several times in order to reduce subjective judgment and to make the procedure the most transparent and replicable as possible.
For each dossier, we then produced three values: h EP2 is the sum of the number of modifications that have been coded EP2 adopted or EP2 partially adopted, h CP is the sum of the modifications coded CP adopted or CP partially adopted, h U is the sum of the remaining modifications. For each dossier d, bargaining success has been determined as follows:
{ Success is assigned to the institution that has managed to insert in the final document a relative majority of amendments that are identical or highly similar to its version of the text.
Success cannot be determined if a relative majority of changes cannot be easily associated with the version of either the parliamentary reading or the common position. Table 3A illustrates the results of this exercise. Wordfish estimates coincide with the handcoding estimates in nine out of the eleven dossiers where we can easily determine the winning institution through the hand-coding procedure. Wordfish estimates based on five documents perform instead more poorly. Only six dossiers display the same outcome as the one produced through hand-coding.
Hand-coding and Wordfish based on three documents produce therefore similar estimates.
Certainly, there is a group of dossiers where hand-coding is difficult but, in these circumstances, it is better to rely on the more reliable and easily replicable Wordfish procedure. 
Comparison with expert-interview estimates
Finally, we compare our estimates with those derived from expert surveys conducted by König et al. (2007) . This study is based on 54 dossiers that reached conciliation between 1999 and 2002. These dossiers comprise 74 issues on which there was disagreement between the two chambers. If we consider issues only, König et al. (2007) (Thomson et al., 2006) , but the two datasets overlap only on seven issues.
We have pointed out in the article the advantages of employing Wordfish in our analysis but, clearly, the differences from the expert-survey approach are glaring and should be subject to further research.
